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“THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS”  
AND TWO ARGUMENTS FOR INTERACTIONISM
Vadim V. Vasilyev
The paper begins with a restatement of Chalmers’s “hard problem of con-
sciousness.” It is suggested that an interactionist approach is one of the pos-
sible solutions of this problem. Some fresh arguments against the identity 
theory and epiphenomenalism as main rivals of interactionism are devel-
oped. One of these arguments has among its corollaries a denial of local su-
pervenience, although not of the causal closure principle. As a result of these 
considerations a version of “local interactionism” (compatible with causal 
closure) is proposed. It is argued that local interactionism may offer a fruitful 
path for resolving the “hard problem.”
In 1994 the more or less routine discussions on the mind-body problem 
were thrown into an uproar by David Chalmers. In his talk at the Uni-
versity of Arizona conference “Toward a Science of Consciousness,” he 
made a distinction between “easy problems of consciousness,” dealing 
scientifically with psychological mechanisms, and “the hard problem 
of consciousness.”1 The hard problem of consciousness is the question: 
Why and how does brain activity give rise to consciousness?2 One can 
bracket the “how” part of the question and give its deepest “why” part a 
more neutral expression: Why is brain activity accompanied by subjective 
experience?3 There have been many responses to this question, but now, 
after fifteen years of discussion, there has emerged a kind of consensus: 
while the hard problem looks like a philosophical question, in fact it is 
hardly possible to solve this problem by philosophical conceptual means, 
and if it can be solved at all, the solution will come from the side of neuro-
science, the progress of which strikes our imagination.4
1David told me in a personal communication that, as far as he remembered, he began using 
this distinction in his Seminar on Consciousness at Washington University “in late 1993.”
2Cf. D. J. Chalmers, “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 2 (1995), pp. 200–219.
3See D. J. Chalmers, Consciousness and Cognition (unpublished, 1990), available at http://
consc.net/papers/c-and-c.html.
4Not everyone would agree that we have such a consensus. Chalmers, for example, be-
lieves it would be better to avoid such sociological remarks. Maybe we should ask experi-
mental philosophers indeed. Still, I believe, most analytic philosophers these days would 
give the kind of answer I have sketched (as is certainly suggested by their preoccupation 
with experimental data in talking about consciousness). Pessimists, like C. McGinn in The 
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I think, however, that this is a rather strange consensus, because it is 
possible to give quite a promising philosophical explanation of the fact 
that brain activity is accompanied by subjective experience with qualia. 
According to this explanation, the brain simply could not work, as it usu-
ally works, without subjective experience—it could not produce behavior 
of the sort that normal human beings demonstrate in their ordinary lives.
Now, we should keep in mind that there are three ways in which one 
might hold that the brain could not work, as it usually works, without 
subjective experience. The first way would occur if subjective experiences 
were a condition of the very existence or efficacy of the physical events 
making up brain activity. This is conceivable, for example, if qualia are 
the substantial basis of physical properties. The attempt to solve the hard 
problem in such a way was made by Chalmers in his 1996 book The Con-
scious Mind, but his recent papers seem to abandon this approach. And it 
is understandable why: it is a highly speculative road, based on a bizarre 
ontological model, lacking arguments in its favor. Among other things, it 
is not clear why physical properties need any basis. Chalmers referred to 
Bertrand Russell’s idea that our knowledge about matter is a knowledge 
of relations only, and relations presuppose the things that relate to each 
other. But no one has yet proven that physical reality as we know it is just 
a complex of relations. It is no surprise that almost nobody among major 
philosophers likes this solution.5
The second way in which subjective experience might be necessary 
for brain activity derives from the identity theory. According to this 
well-known theory, originating in works of U. Place, H. Feigl, and J. J. 
C. Smart, so-called subjective experience is identical with physical pro-
cesses in the brain, and thereby is necessary for its normal activity. Since 
its presentation fifty years ago this theory has been sharply criticized 
from many angles. I am quite convinced by that criticism, especially by 
objections to this theory proposed by S. Kripke, D. Chalmers, and M. 
McKinsey.6 To their semantic arguments I would add another one, of a 
different kind: the basic proposition of the identity theory, if we under-
stand this proposition as a statement about the ontological identity of 
qualia and physical processes in the brain, does not allow verification, 
in contrast, say, to the thesis of the identity of the Morning Star and 
the Evening Star. It might be possible to verify a thesis of a correlation 
Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World (New York: Basic Books, 1999), and 
conceptualists, like Chalmers, do not represent the mainstream view. 
5One of the exceptions is Gregg Rosenberg, who defends a similar view in his A Place for 
Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). See also E. Holman, “Panpsychism, Physicalism, Neutral Monism and the Rus-
sellian Theory of Mind,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 15.5 (2008), pp. 48–67.
6S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); 
D. J. Chalmers, “The Two-dimensional Argument against Materialism,” The Character of 
Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming); M. McKinsey, “Refuta-
tion of Qualia-physicalism,” Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry, ed. M. 
O’Rourke and C. Washington (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 469–498.
516 Faith and Philosophy
between physical processes and some qualitative experiences, but propo-
nents of identity theory (except perhaps Ullin Place) make a distinction 
between correlation and identity. If the identity theory cannot be veri-
fied, it should be rejected. And the common suggestion that the identity 
theory is an example of “inference to the best explanation” is of no help. 
Such inferences can make sense only when it is possible to verify them. 
Otherwise they lead to absurdity. Let us imagine, for example, that we 
have found a curious anomaly: two clocks of a different construction in 
different parts of the world are in exact synchrony with each other. We 
have no idea how this is possible. So what? Should we infer to the “best 
explanation,” saying that these two clocks are in reality just one clock, 
that is, identical? But we cannot even imagine how they could be a single 
clock, except in a figurative sense. As we have no method of verification 
of the “clocks identity theory,” this theory should be unacceptable, as it 
surely is. But the very same considerations can be applied to the mind-
brain identity theory.7
Thus, if we still want to solve the hard problem of consciousness by 
appeal to the necessity of qualitative mental properties or states for our 
brain activity, we seem to have no choice but to turn to the third way 
in which this necessity might arise. According to this way, qualia are 
ontologically distinct from physical properties but have a real influence 
on physical processes in the brain. This is none other than interaction-
ism (but not necessarily substance interactionism; I think we have more 
reasons to accept a kind of emergent interactionism). Interactionism is 
not a very popular position among analytic philosophers, and the rea-
son is fear that it leads to violating the causal closure principle, which, 
as many believe, is a foundation of a contemporary physics. I hope that 
we can avoid such violation, and I will return to this topic at the end of 
the paper.
However, now I want to note that, if we set aside the identity theory, 
it looks like the only serious alternative to the preceding kind of interac-
tionism is epiphenomenalism, a theory according to which our qualitative 
mental states are ontologically distinct from physical reality but have no 
influence on physical processes. In recent times there have been a few at-
tempts to destroy epiphenomenalism. The main goal of the present paper 
is to survey these attempts briefly, to show that they don’t provide conclu-
sive arguments against epiphenomenalism, and to supplement them with 
two other arguments. One of these two arguments is only relatively new, 
although I hope to strengthen it here. But the other argument is quite new 
and, I hope, conclusive. In the course of offering this second argument, I 
7Common criticism of the verification principle misses the point in our case. It seems to 
be true that when we talk about some abstract propositions, the verification principle does 
not work, as indicated by S. Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1: The 
Dawn of Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 289–291. But in our case 
the proposition in question is a factual one, and no one, as far as I know, has managed to 
show that this principle does not work with propositions of such a kind.
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will also give reasons for accepting the interactionist position about qualia 
that I have mentioned above.
1
If we try to sum up the current arguments against epiphenomenalism we 
notice that they can be divided into two groups: (1) arguments from com-
mon sense, and (2) more special philosophical arguments. The argument 
from common sense usually takes this form: ordinary experience shows 
us that our qualitative mental states, such as pains or desires,8 play an 
important role in the production of our behavior.9 If, say, I want a drink 
of water, then it seems obvious that my subsequent behavior through 
which I satisfy this desire is in some sense determined by it. However, 
the epiphenomenalist can easily avoid this objection by noting that our 
ordinary experience shows only a correlation between mental states and 
behavior. But correlation is not yet causation. It is possible that the real 
causes of my behavior are some neuronal processes, hidden from ordi-
nary experience. They produce not only the behavior, but epiphenomenal 
mental states as well. And, as real causes are not directly available to us, 
we take these epiphenomenal states for the real causes of the behavior. 
But this is just an illusion. And it is not common sense which produces 
this illusion. Rather it is produced by philosophers who misinterpret the 
common-sense attitude.
For a long time the main special philosophical argument against epi-
phenomenalism was an argument from evolutionary theory.10 It goes as 
follows: if qualitative mental states, or consciousness, were not causally ef-
ficacious, then they could not play an adaptive role and be under pressure 
of natural selection; and so they could not evolve at all. This argument, 
however, presupposes that all enduring phenotypic traits have a positive 
adaptive value and cannot be adaptively neutral. But this presupposition 
does not follow from the theory of evolution. Let us suppose that trait A 
has a positive adaptive value but that the mutation as a result of which 
it originates produces another neutral trait B as well. In such a case we 
would have a neutral enduring phenotypic trait. And consciousness very 
well could have been such a neutral trait, connected with adaptive behav-
ioral patterns. So it seems this argument also fails.
In recent decades there has also emerged an epistemological argument 
against epiphenomenalism:11 if consciousness does not affect behavior, 
8It goes without saying that desires can be interpreted as behavioral dispositions. I be-
lieve, however, that they (as well as other conscious mental states) also have a qualitative 
side. Cf. J. R. Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
p. 134.
9See, for example, R. Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), p. 1.
10In recent times this Jamesian argument has been pushed forward by William Hasker, 
The Emergent Self (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
11It is not clear who invented this kind of argument. Recently, it has been vigorously 
defended by A. Elitzur. See, for example, A. Elitzur, “Consciousness Makes a Difference: A 
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then our reasonings about consciousness do not depend on its existence. 
The knowledge expressed in such reasonings is not derived from con-
sciousness and its properties. Correspondingly, this knowledge is not a 
knowledge about consciousness. And if this is so, then, assuming the truth 
of epiphenomenalism, we can reasonably doubt that we can know any-
thing about consciousness. Or, rather, if epiphenomenalism is true, then 
our consciousness should be something totally unknowable. But, as a mat-
ter of fact, we know something about consciousness, and this fact means 
that consciousness must have a real influence on our behavior. Defenders 
of epiphenomenalism (such as D. Chalmers),12 however, respond13 that 
this argument is based on the so-called causal theory of knowledge: in 
order to know something about any object I should have been affected by 
it. As consciousness is causally impotent it is impossible to know about 
it. But why should we believe in the universality of the causal theory of 
knowledge? How can we exclude the possibility that some things could 
be known immediately? And if we cannot eliminate that possibility, as 
well as the possibility that consciousness is such an object of immediate 
knowledge,14 then the epistemological argument against epiphenomenal-
ism loses its force.
2
Given the failure of the preceding arguments against epiphenomenalism, 
we might at this point conclude that epiphenomenalism is immune to any 
conceptual objections.15 But I don’t think so. And now I am going to pro-
vide such objections. I begin with another argument from common sense. 
One of our common-sense attitudes is a belief in the reality of other minds. 
Is this attitude compatible with epiphenomenalism? I infer the existence 
of other minds on the basis of the similarity of my behavior to the behav-
ior of other beings. My behavior is accompanied by subjective experience, 
and, if I see a similar behavior, I conclude that the being which behaves 
Reluctant Dualist’s Confession,” Irreducibly Conscious, ed. A. Batthyany, D. Constant, and A. 
Elitzur, (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, forthcoming), where he sums up his ideas 
on this topic.
12Chalmers is not an epiphenomenalist. Still, he believes that epiphenomenalism can be 
saved from criticism and that it has no crucial logical flaws. See Chalmers, The Conscious 
Mind, p. 160.
13Ibid., p. 196.
14Robert Kirk, Zombies and Consciousness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005) attempts to 
show that this line of defence is flawed; I do not think, however, that he succeeds in this at-
tempt. His argument is based on an odd thought experiment about a zombie with pictures 
on the soles of his feet, which are exactly parallel and analogous to Kirk’s visual qualia. Then 
he concludes that as there obviously could not be an “epistemic intimacy” as regards those 
pictures, the same is true about qualia. I think this argument is a non-starter, because I see 
no reasons to accept such an analogy: qualia, in contrast to “sole-pictures,” incorporate some 
relation to a subject.
15I set aside experimental objections, if there are any: in fact, with Libet’s famous data at 
hand, an epiphenomenalist could easily disarm them. See B. Libet, Mind Time: The Temporal 
Factor in Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
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in such a way also has a subjective experience, that is, consciousness or 
mind. But epiphenomenalism denies the causal connection between be-
havior and consciousness. And if it were right in this denial, it seems I 
would have no reason to admit the existence of other minds. Of course, I 
would see that the behavior of other beings is similar to my behavior. But 
so what? They could behave in such a way even without consciousness. 
Why indeed should I assume they have subjective experience?
Of course, some epiphenomenalists would say that in reality they 
do not deny any connection between consciousness and behavior. They 
would insist that the very same processes in the brain which produce 
behavior produce our epiphenomenal consciousness as well. So while 
our consciousness has no influence on our behavior, the lack of con-
sciousness would mean the lack of its neuronal basis and some changes 
in behavior. But on such a view, how could we know that our epiphe-
nomenal consciousness is produced by the very same brain activity that 
produces our particular behavior? From the position of common sense, 
we cannot refer to any experimental scientific data. The only way left is 
to refer to some simplicity considerations. And some partisans of epi-
phenomenalism in fact appeal to such considerations. They say that a 
possible world in which my epiphenomenal consciousness is produced 
by brain activity distinct from the brain activity producing my specifi-
cally human behavior, and where only my behavior might be accom-
panied by subjective experience, while other human and non-human 
animals might be simply zombies, would be much less uniform than our 
world where we assume a systematic correlation between a certain kind 
of behavior and consciousness.
Since simplicity considerations originate in common sense, it seems that 
even if we accept epiphenomenalism, we can still retain the idea of the ex-
istence of other minds. Still, I am sure this is the wrong line of argument 
to follow. I am not going to deny that simplicity considerations originate 
in common sense. But my point is that, in fact, the world in which only 
I am epiphenomenally conscious would be much more simple than the 
“more uniform” world replete with epiphenomenal minds. Indeed, this 
second world shows us a classic example of multiplying essences without 
any necessity.16 I have no need to postulate the reality of other epiphenom-
enal minds: it would be a waste of ontological material, as by definition 
they must be impotent. At best I could adopt the “intentional stance” (à 
la Dennett) toward other human beings and non-human animals, because 
it would help to predict their behavior—without making any ontological 
commitments to actual intentional states in these beings. (We make no on-
tological commitments to computers’ having intentional states of different 
kinds when, for example, we play chess with them.)
16Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, and W. S. Robinson (in his comprehensive entry on epi-
phenomenalism, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism) discuss this topic but 
do not pay due attention to this point.
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So we see that epiphenomenalism concerning my own consciousness 
leads to the zombification of other people and animals. As this zombifica-
tion contradicts common sense, epiphenomenalism is incompatible with 
common sense.
And the conclusion that epiphenomenalism must fail can be strength-
ened with the help of another argument. This second—special philosoph-
ical—argument is based on three premises. Each of these premises looks 
quite unproblematic. The first premise is that identical (from the qualita-
tive side) events can have different causes. This point is a commonplace. 
For example, the same rise in stock markets can be caused by different 
factors; you could break a cup in the same way with your left hand or 
with your right hand, etc. Speaking abstractly, any event is something like 
a vector, which can be considered as a sum of other vectors. And it is obvi-
ous that different components (in our case different components of a com-
plex cause) can bring about the same resultant. The second premise is also 
quite obvious, or so it seems. It notes that the memories belonging to hu-
man beings reflect or represent their past lives, their individual histories, 
and, in general, these memories do so correctly. Finally, the third premise 
directs our attention to the fact that our behavior is correlated with the 
qualitative mental states we have. For example, if I want to drink some 
water, I pick up a glass of water, not a glass of wine. Even the epiphenom-
enalist would not deny a correlation of this kind. Of course, there may be 
cases in which such correlation does not hold, but, as a rule, it holds.
As far as I can see, these premises are independent of each other. And, 
let me repeat, I am sure that they would hardly give rise to controversy. 
It is interesting, however, that combining them leads to the refutation of 
epiphenomenalism and provides a strong case for interactionism. Indeed, 
if identical events can (in the sense of real, or “natural,” possibility, and 
not just of logical possibility) have quite different causes, and if my brain 
at a given moment of time can be considered as a sum of neural events 
(all or at least some of which could have had different causes), then it is 
obvious that its current complex state could have been a result of very 
different trains of events, very different causal trajectories. But in such a 
case I would have had a different individual history, and, according to the 
second premise, other memories, than I actually have. And the contents of 
our memories are the source of intentional objects (which are qualitative 
in their nature) of other mental states, like beliefs and desires. Meanwhile, 
the third premise tells us that our desires and other mental states are cor-
related with our behavior. Hence, if my current physical state had been the 
result of a different train of events, providing me with different memories, 
desires and so on, then, while being (currently) the same physically as I ac-
tually am, I would behave differently. And the differences in my behavior 
would depend on the fact that I would have different mental states. And 
if this is so, we must admit that my actual behavior also crucially depends 
on the mental states I currently have. And that fact means that our qualita-
tive mental states have a real impact on our behavior.
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When I discussed this argument with some colleagues, they proposed 
a few objections, which I am going to survey here. Some said that while all 
the premises are correct, the conclusion may not follow in case of a Put-
nam-like externalist scenario. Indeed, it is possible to have had a different 
individual history simply due to some differences in environment, for ex-
ample. And such differences could be undetectable at the qualitative level 
of our memories. Then I could have had a different past than I actually 
have, but still I would have the very same memories. I think this is really 
possible, but this fact does not affect my argument, because such scenarios 
do not exclude other scenarios where the differences are detectable at the 
level of perceptions and memories. Such scenarios are also possible, and 
that is all that I need for my conclusion.
Another objection17 draws our attention to the fact that, according to 
my argument, my present mental states depend not only on the physical 
state of my brain, but also on my past experiences. The worry is that such 
dependence may involve some kind of a “causal action at a temporal dis-
tance,” that is, from the past to present, which is hard to swallow. I think, 
however, that in reality we have no serious reasons to worry. First of all, 
not every dependence is a causal one. There is such a thing as logical de-
pendence, for instance, and our case can give an example of it. But, what is 
even more important, we will see that in fact we have no need to deny the 
supervenience principle at all, that is, we have no need to deny the strict 
dependence of my present mental states on physical states (only after de-
nying the supervenience principle would we have a need for additional 
causation). All we need to deny is the local supervenience principle, but 
this can leave intact the global supervenience principle (I will discuss this 
later). Of course, such denial can shock somebody and maybe is also hard 
to swallow, but that is what my argument is about. And a priori it is dif-
ficult to understand why the local supervenience principle (same brain–
same qualia) is more solid that the reverse principle (same qualia–same 
brain) which is universally denied since the coming of functionalism. We 
simply have to reject some philosophical superstitions.
The only way to criticize my argument, I think, is to attack its prem-
ises. But as these premises are universally accepted, the burden of proof 
is on those who want to attack them. And it hardly helps to say that all 
these premises express theses that allow exclusions, and that scenarios 
I describe presuppose the very same exclusions. It hardly helps because 
this thesis is also to be proved, and I see no clear ways to prove it.
3
So, if the arguments above are correct, epiphenomenalism is wrong, and 
we should accept interactionism. And then “the hard problem of con-
sciousness” mentioned at the beginning of this paper could have the an-
swer that I sketched above: brain activity is accompanied by subjective 
17Made by Richard Swinburne.
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experience because without such accompaniment our brains, being the 
same physically, simply could not work as they usually work, and that’s 
because our mental states do indeed affect our behavior.
But now it is time to think about the cost of this answer. If we admit 
that mental states have an influence on brain processes, we are in danger 
of destroying the causal closure principle, that is, the principle according 
to which every physical event has an immediate physical cause.18 But why 
should we be so worried about violation of this principle?
I see at least two reasons to worry. First of all, as I have already men-
tioned, some philosophers believe that the renunciation of this principle 
leads to the demolition of the very basis of experimental physics. Second-
ly, it is rather difficult to deny this principle, as it may be ranked among 
the fundamental natural beliefs that guide us in our ordinary life.
The first of these reasons is not, I think, very dangerous. For example, 
David Papineau has shown that until the twentieth century experimental 
physics did not in fact presuppose the causal closure principle.19 Papineau 
is probably right that in the twentieth century this principle became more 
significant for scientists and philosophers. It is clear, however, that the 
core of contemporary physics is quantum mechanics, and the relation of 
quantum mechanics to that principle is notoriously ambiguous, as some 
interpretations of quantum mechanics allow for the crucial role of the con-
scious observer in the collapse of the wave function.
The second reason to worry seems to me much more serious. I think 
that our belief in causal closure can be counted among our natural beliefs. 
Admitttedly, this is far from obvious, and in fact is not a commonplace 
opinion. Still, we can try to prove it by connecting the causal closure prin-
ciple with one or another natural belief, such as our belief in the corre-
spondence between the past and the future experiences. To demonstrate 
this connection we should do some kind of phenomenological analysis. In 
outline, this analysis looks as follows. As Hume has shown, our reason-
ings about facts are based on inferences from the past to the future. Such 
inferences presuppose our belief in the correspondence or “conformity be-
tween the future and the past.” Looking closely at this belief, we see that it 
implicitly incorporates the causal closure principle. Indeed, let us suppose 
that it is possible to infer from the past to the future and deny the causal 
closure principle at the same time. If this principle is denied we should be 
ready to accept that there could be situations in which an external physical 
event B could have no physical correlate (necessarily connected with it) in 
the previous moment of time. Then, if that previous event A is repeated, 
we would have no reasons to believe that it will be succeeded by the event 
B. Note that we could not rely on possible mental causes of B included in 
A, as they are not among our experiences (and, as we saw in the previous 
18Cf. E. J. Lowe, “Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism,” Philosophy 75 (2000), pp. 
571–585.
19D. Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
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section, we cannot infer to them from the physical characteristics of event 
A). And, lacking such beliefs, we would not be able to infer from the past 
to the future. It follows that our belief in the conformity between the fu-
ture and the past includes belief in the causal closure principle, when we 
think about physical processes outside our body. And if our belief in the 
conformity between the future and the past leads us to conclude that the 
behavior of other people is determined by physical causes, it is reasonable 
to generalize this conclusion to ourselves. So it is better not to deny the 
causal closure principle.
I understand, of course, that this brief argument needs to be developed 
in more detail. But that is not my purpose here. All I want to do is to in-
dicate a possible line of argumentation for the causal closure principle. 
For the purposes of this paper it suffices to stipulate that this principle is 
true (and most philosophers would agree with that) and see what happens 
next. So let us assume that we have no choice but to accept causal closure.
4
Can we reconcile the causal closure principle with the thesis that mental 
states have an impact on behavior? In order to find an answer to this ques-
tion let us return to the proof of the causal efficacy of mental states. We 
saw that we can infer such efficacy on the basis of the assumption that 
one and the same brain could be accompanied by different sets of mental 
states, if we assume also the correlation between mental states and behav-
ior. Combining these assumptions gives us the following conclusion: if I 
consider my brain, then an answer to the question “Why does my brain 
produce the behavior it produces?” is impossible without taking into ac-
count the particular mental states I have: I could have other mental states, 
and then my brain would produce quite a different behavior. Looking into 
this argument, we see that it presupposes an important qualification, ex-
pressed in the phrase “if I consider my brain, etc.” That is, we can prove 
the efficacy of mental states by the local consideration of a material system 
we are interested in. In other words, up until now, we have talked about 
local interactionism only.
This is an important qualification, and if we free ourselves from it and 
consider my brain in the context of the whole universe, the picture may 
change drastically. Indeed, couldn’t we assume in such a case that my be-
havior is determined by physical causes after all, only not just by local 
physical factors in the brain but also by non-local physical factors as well? 
This assumption could help us to save the causal closure principle.
It is clear that this also is not a solution without costs. Apart from allow-
ing a notion of non-local causality, we again face the question about the 
role of mental states in producing brain activity: are they epiphenomenal 
after all?
Before answering this question, I should mention that the solution we 
are now considering has some obvious merits as well. Most importantly, it 
can help to save the lawlike relation between the physical and the mental. 
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When I argued that local interactionism is true, we came to the conclu-
sion that one and the same brain could be accompanied by quite different 
mental states.20 As I have already mentioned, this conclusion contradicts 
the local supervenience principle, which establishes an univocal corre-
spondence between the brain and its qualitative mental states. And if the 
local supervenience principle is wrong, we might doubt whether there ex-
ists any lawlike connection between mental states and the brain. The only 
chance to save such a relation is to show that while the local supervenience 
principle does not work, this might not affect the global supervenience 
principle, according to which identical physical worlds are accompanied 
by the same mental states.21 Indeed, from the denial of the local superve-
nience principle it doesn’t follow that the global supervenience principle 
is also to be denied. For if the global supervenience principle is true, then 
the falsity of the local supervenience principle means no more than that 
if my brain were accompanied by a different set of mental states, then the 
physical world as a whole would not be the same as it is now: there would 
be some differences in it.
Now it is possible to combine this picture with the causal closure prin-
ciple. Suppose that non-local (as regards my brain) physical differences 
of a world in which my brain occurs are accompanied by a different set 
(compared to the actual world) of mental states that are correlated with 
a different behavior. Then these non-local physical differences might be 
considered to be a non-local physical part of the cause of such different 
behavior. And, correspondingly, the physical differences of the actual 
world—in comparison with the physical features of that possible world—
might be considered to be a non-local physical part of the cause of my be-
havior in the actual world. Hence, accepting the causal closure principle in 
combination with local interactionism, we get a confirmation of the global 
supervenience principle, which in turn can provide us with a reason to 
believe in the lawlike connection between mental states and their physi-
cal bases. It is only that the physical bases now extend beyond the local, 
physical features of my brain itself.
5
The possibility of such a lawlike connection gives us hope that it will 
be possible to find a new answer (since, if we believe in causal closure, 
the straightforward interactionistic answer is wrong) to Chalmers’s ques-
tion: Why is my brain activity accompanied by subjective experience? In 
order to see how this new answer arises, note that the above discussion 
raises the following problem: if we retain the causal closure principle and 
20J. C. Fisher, “Why Nothing Mental is Just in the Head,” Nous 41 (2007), pp. 318–334 
comes to a similar conclusion, using different arguments and thought experiments. I have 
published some of my results in V. Vasilyev, “Brain and Consciousness: Exits from the Laby-
rinth,” Social Sciences 37 (2006), pp. 51–66.
21See J. Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2006), pp. 9–10 for 
details.
“THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS” 525
introduce, in the way that we have above, the idea of non-local physical 
factors in the causation of our behavior, then we may get the impression 
that our mental states are epiphenomenal after all. And it is hard to ex-
plain the existence of epiphenomenal mental states.
However, this problem can be solved. Our situation here is in fact to-
tally different from the one in which we usually talk about epiphenom-
enalism. If our behavior could be explained by local physical processes in 
the brain, the existence of mental states would be miraculous. But if we 
have already proved that our mental states make a difference at the local 
physical level, and if we then assume that their physical effects still could 
have had some physical, although non-local, correlates, then we might 
be inclined to think that it is these non-local correlates that are a kind of 
epiphenomena. The reason is simple: in general, we have no empirical evi-
dence to believe in non-local causation. But if we want to insist that these 
non-local correlates are real causes, then, it seems, we should accept the 
following schema: as non-local causality is not universal, it is not uncon-
ditional; and so it is quite plausible that the condition under which a non-
local physical correlate might be considered as a cause (or as a component 
of a complex cause) of some event is precisely the very existence of private 
mental states accompanying this event within some physical system and 
correlating with it. In other words, mental states seem to be something 
like mediators in the realization of non-local physical causation. They are 
such mediators not in the sense that they are intermediary links between 
the non-local factors and behavior (this would violate the causal closure 
principle) but in the sense that they are necessary ontological conditions 
of the realization of non-local physical causation.22 In such a case the men-
tal states would not be epiphenomenal; they would have causal relevance, 
if not causal efficacy.
If this is the right way to go, then not only can we explain why our 
brain activity is accompanied by subjective experience, but we can also 
begin to try explaining how that accompaniment is possible. (Recall that 
the full version of Chalmers’s question includes a request for how it is that 
brain activity is accompanied by consciousness.) Indeed, since it is very 
likely that our mental states emerge from brain activity, and if we then 
take into account that these states must be ontological conditions of non-
local physical causation, we can suppose that they are produced by physi-
cal systems, which would demonstrate some kind of non-deterministic 
behavior in the physical systems themselves if we ignore the role of the 
mental states in the realization of the non-local physical causation. In oth-
er words, the mechanisms due to which some physical systems produce 
mental states must have a relation to the incompleteness, at the physi-
cal level, of their local causal patterns. I should note, however, that this 
scheme does not mean that the existence of mental states is just an odd 
22This conclusion may possibly illustrate what Lowe, “Causal Closure Principles,” calls 
“causation by a mental event of a physical causal fact.”
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consequence of some physical anomaly. In fact, we saw (see section 2 of 
the present paper) that the existence of mental states connected with some 
physical systems provides such systems with an opportunity to take ac-
count of their individual histories;23 and that fact, in turn, can give them a 
big adaptive advantage.
So our return to the hard problem of consciousness and its possible 
solution helps us to see that the approach of David Chalmers in The Con-
scious Mind is probably the most fruitful one after all. Let me recall that in 
that book he considers a solution of the hard problem based on the thesis 
that mental states are ontological conditions of the realization of physical 
causation and even of the very existence of physical properties. At the 
beginning of this paper I said that this idea is rather bizarre. But it looks 
bizarre only while we use it in the context of a neo-Russellian ontological 
scheme (in which mental states are something like vehicles of physical 
properties), as Chalmers did. And from the arguments above, it follows 
that after some modifications in that scheme this approach may open the 
way to solving the hard problem. As Ned Block has noticed, to solve the 
hard problem is to close an “explanatory gap.”24 It is interesting, however, 
that Block, as well as J. Levine,25 believe there is no difference in explana-
tory gaps when we try to understand why subjective experience exists and 
when we try to understand why we have just this subjective experience. 
But while we certainly cannot find an answer to the second question yet, 
we are in a much more promising situation in regard to the first one.26
Lomonosov Moscow State University
23If this is true, then no purely mechanical system can simulate human behavior exactly. 
Indeed, any such system behaves on the basis of its current physical state only. This fact 
means that not only epiphenomenalism is wrong; the very same can be said about “con-
scious inessentialism.” (See O. Flanagan, “Conscious Inessentialism and the Epiphenomenal-
ism Suspicion,” The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, ed. N. Block, O. Flanagan, 
and G. Güzeldere [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997], pp. 357–373.) And maybe John Searle 
and many others were a bit too over-optimistic in their belief in so-called Weak AI. This over-
optimism distracted their attention from the fact that, say, Searle’s famous Chinese Room 
(which allegedly passes the Turing Test) simply cannot work; it cannot, for example, provide 
reasonable answers to some indexical questions, like “What time is it now?”
24N. Block, “Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness,” The Cognitive Neurosci-
ences IV, ed. М. Gazzaniga (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming). 
25J. Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001); cf. J. Levine, “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap,” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 64 (1983), pp. 354–361.
26I am grateful to Robert Howell whose suggestions were of much help to me in writing 
this article. I owe also a great debt to David Chalmers, Noam Chomsky, Daniel Dennett, Ned 
Block, David Armstrong, Richard Swinburne, and Michael McKinsey for their comments in 
our personal communications. 
